Navigating the Impact: Turkey’s Foreign Policy Post-2018 US Sanctions on Iran

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Abstract

As a strong ally of the US, Turkey was subject to economic penalties in May 2018 for its continued imports of Iranian oil. Turkey delayed deciding whether to import Iranian oil despite this pressure. The purpose of this study is to examine Turkey’s foreign policy about the importation of Iranian oil in 2018. The study uses a qualitative method with an explanatory analysis approach, drawing on the foreign policy theories of Morgan and Palmer, which highlight the objectives of proaction and security. The results show that Turkey’s foreign policy goals are more proactive due to two major variables. First, Turkey and the United States do not work together well. Second, Turkey’s proaction-oriented foreign policy is influenced by its capabilities, which include military might, alternative alliances, influence both regionally and internationally, and bargaining power. Turkey forms new alliances with Iran, China, and Russia, primarily concentrating on deepening its relationship with Russia. Furthermore, Turkey has a great deal of regional and global influence, as seen by its mediating role in the Syrian Israeli crisis in 2011. Turkey’s foreign policy dynamics are further emphasized by its negotiating stance with the United States over the Incirlik zone. In conclusion, Turkey’s strategic negotiating positions, alliance preferences, and regional and global capacities all influence its complex foreign policy strategy.

Keywords; Foreign Policy, Turkey, United States, Iran, Proaction, two good theory

1. INTRODUCTION

Iran was subject to an embargo in 2007 when the US judged its nuclear development to be excessive and suspicious. Turkey supported the United States by lowering its purchases of Iranian oil. In addition, in 2007 the United States of America took issue with a deal between Turkey and Iran that allowed Turkey to facilitate natural gas exports from Iran to Europe. Ultimately, Turkey was compelled to back out of the agreement. Krisman (2010) stated.

Similar to 2007, the US imposed another embargo on Iran in 2012 and put pressure on Turkey to do the same. In the end, Turkey’s position on the embargo of sanctions against Iran remained unchanged. Turkey cut its oil imports to Iran by more than 20% in 2012. Turkey was compelled to take this action in reaction to the sanctions that the US threatened to apply to its allies and partners if they failed to carry out the sanctions intended for Iran. Remarkably, the US imposed economic penalties on Iran once more in May 2018 following its withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which aimed to restrict Iran’s nuclear development. penalties will be applied to nations that refuse to cease importing oil from Iran in addition to these penalties.
The US through Senator Bon Menendez stated "Today we are giving all countries that still import petroleum and petroleum products from Iran three months to significantly reduce their imports. Otherwise, they will be threatened with severe sanctions against their financial institutions." (Senior State Department Official, 2018). The Senior State Department Official further explained that the U.S. targets that by November 4, 2018, Iran's oil imports will be at 0% (Senior State Department Official, 2018). This is done by utilizing its diplomatic power to urge, persuade, and negotiate with partners to reduce Iran's investment to the lowest point (via teleconference) (Senior State Department Official, 2018).

Turkey's stance has changed in the wake of the August 2018 sanctions embargo that Iran was subject to. Turkey would rather ignore the US's threats to halt oil shipments from Iran until November 4, 2018. quoted Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu as saying, "We do not have to adhere to the sanctions imposed on a country by another country," during a July 2018 press conference in the Republic of Northern Cyprus, Lefkoşa. We also believe that the sanctions are unjust. (Sabah Daily, 2018)

Additionally, he stated that Turkey had consented to prolong the agreement, which was scheduled to be finalized in 2020, to import 9.6 billion barrels of natural gas and oil from Iran until 2026. (Rzayeva, Austvik, 2016:7). Furthermore, early in August 2018, Fatih Dönmez, Turkey's Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, declared that Turkey would carry on its natural gas trade with Iran in compliance with the long-term agreement reached with Tehran." (Sabah Daily, 2018) In contrast to what it did the year before, Turkey decided in 2018 to react to the US embargo penalties against Iran. Given the tight bilateral ties that exist between Turkey and the US, this is a strange development.

In general, Turkey has benefited greatly from the US since the establishment of the bilateral relationship between the two countries. from the domains of politics, economy, security, and other areas. Turkey's 1952 admission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was one of its advantages (Zanotti, 2016). Turkey's handling of security situations about its border conflict with Russia was made easier by its participation in NATO. To exert pressure on Armenia and Georgia, the Soviet Union desired normalization of its location alongside Turkey in eastern Anatolia. Lavrentiy Beria, one of the deputy heads of state, "whispered" to Soviet Union President Stalin that the forces in southwest Georgia had previously been seized by the Ottoman Turkish empire (Muhaimin, 2018). However, this declaration came to an end in May 1953, a year after Turkey joined NATO and established diplomatic ties with the United States (Ulgul, 2010). Turkey received economic benefits from the US in addition to security advantages. The US directed US economic support, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), during and after the financial crisis in 2001, when Turkey was impacted by the global crisis (Habibi, 2012). Notwithstanding the losses brought about by the crisis, Turkey was able to weather it thanks to these aid benefits.
Turkey has disregarded threats from the US directed at nations that do not quickly cease purchasing Iranian oil. In addition, the Turkish president declared that if the US continues its embargo, he has other options (alliances), specifically: “Before it is too late, Washington must give up the misguided notion that our relationship can be asymmetrical and come to terms with the fact that Turkey has alternatives. Failure to reverse this trend of unilateralism and disrespect will require us to start looking for new friends and allies”. (Recep Tayyip Erdogan, 2018). (New York Times, 2018). The US decided to impose economic penalties on the nations that make up its alliance on November 5, 2018. Turkey, an ally of the United States, decided to keep importing oil from Iran. Turkey was among the eight nations granted permission by the US to import oil from Iran in retaliation.

Several earlier articles have examined Turkey’s foreign policy, including one by Ali Askerov titled "Turkey’s 'Zero Problems with the Neighbors' Policy: What is Realistic?" Sufri (2016) The main topic of discussion in this article is whether Turkey should still pursue its foreign policy of having zero problems with its neighbors. The second piece is titled "The Cost of Security: Foreign Policy Concessions and Military Alliance" and was written by Jesse C. Johnson. This article explores and elucidates the continuity of a nation’s military alliances, which impacts that nation’s power dynamics, both positively and negatively. (Johnson, 2015). The following article, Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Iranian Nuclear Program: In Search of a New Middle East Order after the Arab Spring and Syrian Civil War, was written by Moritz Pieper. This study assumes that Erdogan’s government regime is currently having an impact on changes in Turkey’s foreign policy orientation toward Iran (Pieper, 2016). From some of the previous studies above, we can conclude that there has been no research analyzing Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Iran embargo sanctions using the conceptual two good theory which researchers assume is appropriate to describe the dilemma faced by Turkey in making decisions. With the application of this theoretical framework, researchers can comprehensively describe the reasons behind a foreign policy taken by the state.

2. RESEARCH METHOD

This research is of the explanatory analysis type. Research of the explanatory analysis type focuses on investigating the link or influence of variables to investigate a problem or phenomenon in greater detail (Rachmat, 2009). The goal of this study is to explain why Turkey continues to import oil from Iran despite the possibility of US economic sanctions following the August 2018 sanctions embargo, which will also have an impact on Turkey’s relationship with the US, with which it is an ally.

Two-Good Theory

Two-Good Theory In the basic assumptions outlined by Morgan and Palmer, where there are two goals that a country tries to obtain through foreign policy, the search for security (security) and the search for proaction. This basic assumption eventually gave birth to the two-good theory (Morgan, Palmer, 1996: 225). Identifying behaviors and conditions that can be classified as security-seeking and those that can be classified as
goal-seeking. One path would follow Morrow, who argues that large states are security trading for proaction (autonomy), and small states are proactive for security, in asymmetric alliances.

a. Security

The status quo that each country has, makes the state have its own standards for meeting the needs of its country (Morgan, Palmer, 1996: 229). This includes what can and cannot be lost or reduced from a country. For example, a state has a security standard that must be equivalent to a value of eight, but when this value decreases, the state will try to find a way out to be able to reach a value of eight again. Some of the state's efforts will be devoted to maintaining aspects of the status quo it likes, referring to these types of behavior as security-seeking (Morgan, Palmer, 1996:227). A country's foreign policy can be said to seek security if it does not initiate conflict (Morgan, Palmer, 1996: 227). Furthermore, countries who opt to pursue security show no signs of a change in alliance (change) in their attitudes and acts, and the state will tend to survive and be friendly to its existing alliance country (Morgan, Palmer, 1996: 227-228). This arises because the present alliance can meet the country’s needs.

b. Proaction

Proaction is an attempt to alter certain components of the present issue resolution. (Morgan, Palmer, 1996: 238) Proaction requires a country to expend resources to modify the target country’s policy. (Morgan, Palmer, 1996:228) In the status quo that each country has, some countries that are categorized as having the (strong) ability to change aspects of the status quo, will try to change it. This state's efforts will be devoted to changing aspects of the status quo that it does not like (Morgan, Palmer, 1996: 228). So a state that tends to be strong, will give most of the benefits it enjoys to the pursuit of proaction. Proaction-seeking activities in a country’s foreign policy must include two key characteristics. First, a proaction-seeking state initiates a dispute, and then we see whether or not the target state replies. (Morgan & Palmer, 1996:228) Second, there is evidence of alliance building, whether through exchange or the formation of a new alliance (Morgan & Palmer, 1996:228).

Proaction is also driven by two factors. The first is the misalignment or inefficiency of existing interactions (Morgan & Palmer, 1996: 241). This mismatch or inefficiency can manifest as a loss in the efficiency of existing partnerships as a result of differences in each country's focus, goals, and demands. Second, the country's rising capacities (Morgan and Palmer, 1996: 241-242). The capabilities in question are measured by military strength, negotiating position, power (regional and worldwide), and ultimately, the proaction-seeking state's relationship with the state of the opposing group to the alliance state. The search for action by a government is designed, among other things, to give what the destination country requires. This can take the form of security, which encompasses more than just military security. Singh and Nunes argue in their article Nontraditional Security: Redefining State-Centric Outlook that security issues also include poverty,
unemployment, social inequality, social injustice, human rights, malnutrition, natural conditions, politics, and economics.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Turkey-US Bilateral Relations; Turkey joined NATO in 1952.

Turkey and the United States have been partners since 1939, beginning with trade cooperation. Turkey joined the United Nations in 1950 and officially joined NATO in February 1952 (Cohn, 1970). The relationship between Turkey and NATO has shifted over time. Turkey has a role to play in this alliance, and membership in NATO serves its objectives, such as national security (Aybet, 2012). Turkey benefits from being included in a group of countries that are not negatively impacted by domestic disputes in neighboring countries.

Turkey's Incirlik region became an air and military base for NATO and the United States, further strengthening their connection. The US began construction of the facility, which is roughly 250 miles southeast of Ankara, Turkey, in the spring of 1951 (Incirlik, 2018). The US Air Force intended to use the base as an emergency staging and recovery facility for medium and heavy bombers. However, the base’s mission altered over time.

The Turkish General Staff and the US Air Force signed a joint usage agreement for the new base in December 1954 (Incirlik 2018). On February 21, 1955, the base was formally called Adana Air Base, and the 7216th Base Air Squadron served as the host unit. The coming years would demonstrate the importance of the Incirlik site to NATO, not only in combating the Soviet threat, but also in responding to Middle Eastern events. Since the base’s inception, the US and NATO have taken several steps in response to difficulties and conflicts in Turkey’s bordering countries, particularly in the Middle East. Adana Air Base is also used by various US military operations in the Middle East:

1. Invasion of Iraq 2003 - 2011

The base (Incirlik) was again a source of friction in the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The Turkish parliament officially rejected the use of the base for the US during the war, although in 2004 US troops and equipment were allowed to transit through Incirlik. The use of the base was important to the US in its invasion of Iraq, due to Turkey's strategic proximity to Iraq.


In 2001, after the 9/11 tragedy, the US and NATO attacked Afghanistan, which was considered responsible for the tragedy. NATO and the US used Incirlik airbase as their base for attacks on Afghanistan until 2015 (Snow, 2017).

In addition to the two things mentioned above, the air base in Incirlik continues to serve various purposes, as does the Incirlik area for the US and NATO in carrying out its respective interests. One of the primary benefits of the air base in Incirlik is its proximity
to Russia, Middle Eastern countries, and European countries. This is advantageous for the US and NATO in monitoring these areas. According to data provided by the United States Air Force in 2015, Incirlik serves eight primary functions: humanitarian assistance, aerial reconnaissance, aerial cover for combat operations, cargo and troop transport, no-fly zone enforcement, refueling hub, leaflet drops, air strikes, and nuclear deterrence (Air Force, 2018).

**Turkey’s membership in the EU**

The United States supported Turkey’s application to become a full member of the European Union. (Lubis, 2015). In the late 1980s, the United States began to help Turkey on the question of Turkish membership in the European Union. (Sayari 2003) However, throughout the next decade, US diplomats began to conduct intense lobbying operations among key US friends in Europe to assist Turkey’s EU ambitions.

Essentially, the US was involved in three major developments in EU-Turkey ties in the 1990s. First, Washington attempted to influence the conclusion of the discussions that resulted in the signing of the Customs Union Agreement by Brussels and Ankara in December 1995. Initially, the European Parliament did not appear to be in favor of a customs union with Turkey, and most observers anticipated a close vote. However, this attitude progressively altered because of the United States’ essential involvement in pushing the European Parliament to accept the Customs Union Agreement, allowing Turkey to gradually attain its desired conclusion. (Sayari 2003) Second, the United States was equally influential in the outcome of the Council of Europe's Helsinki Summit in December 1999, which formally recognized Turkey's candidacy for full membership. (Sayari, 2003:168–169). Washington had fiercely opposed the EU’s decision in Luxembourg two years earlier to exclude Turkey from the list of official contenders for eventual membership. In 1999, the Clinton administration used significant pressure through formal and informal channels, including phone calls from President Clinton to European leaders, to reverse that decision. Top Clinton administration officials exerted intense pressure on their European counterparts, which played a critical role in changing EU policy toward Turkey. Third, before to the EU meeting in Copenhagen on December 12, 2002, the United States reiterated its willingness to boost Turkey's EU membership prospects. (Sayari, 2003:168-170). On December 11, 2002, President Bush met with Tayyip Erdogan, the leader of the Justice and Development Party, at the White House and underlined Washington's support for Turkey, stating that "the U.S. stands side by side with Ankara in its efforts to join the European Union." (Sayari, 2003: 170-172).

**US Economic Assistance to Turkey during the 2001 Crisis**

Turkey experienced acute financial and economic crises in November 2000 and February 2001, causing significant suffering for many Turkish individuals. These events posed a significant challenge to the government, which has been working to restore confidence at home and abroad. Kemal Dervis, the Turkish Minister of Economy, was tasked with coordinating economic policies, and on March 2, 2001, the cabinet passed a
significant package of financial and economic reforms. The IMF and World Bank provided financial assistance, and several key economic measures were promptly implemented in the second quarter of 2001 (Commission of the European Community, 2010). These reforms were designed to solve the crisis and help achieve the economic requirements for EU membership. The United States also gave economic aid to Turkey during the 2001 economic crisis, which was caused by the worldwide crisis. During the financial crisis, the United States provided both direct and indirect economic support via the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Habibi, 2012).

**US Embargo Sanctions Against Iran, 2012**

The embargo restrictions imposed by the US on Iran in 2012 were not the first time it had received them. These sanctions have existed since 1979 but were implemented in 1980. The US sanctions against Iran were imposed in response to US suspicions about Iran's nuclear development, which were based on evidence disclosed by the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) in 2003. Although the results show that there are no military activities related to Iran's nuclear development, this does not preclude the possibility of such activities occurring (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2012).

Tables 1 and 2 will detail some of the sanctions imposed by the United States in response to Iran's nuclear development, which is deemed to imperil other countries. These sanctions began in 1979 and lasted until 2013. The level of sanctions imposed ranges, ranging from minor to extreme. Even though these sanctions are thought to be capable of halting Iran's nuclear development efforts, Iran continues to pursue nuclear weapons, causing US displeasure to persist until now.

### Table 1

**US Embargo Sanctions against Iran Up to 2005**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description of Select Elements.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive Orders 12170, 12205, 12211</td>
<td>Nov, 1979 April 1980</td>
<td>Blocked Iranian property and prohibited some trade, including the import of all goods from Iran. Bans were lifted under the Algiers Accords in 1981.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Sponsor of Terror Designation</td>
<td>January 1984</td>
<td>Banned arms sales and foreign assistance to Iran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Order 12613</td>
<td>October 1987</td>
<td>Banned import of all goods from Iran, including oil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran-Iraq Arms Non-proliferation Act</td>
<td>October 1992</td>
<td>Sanctioned transfer of goods or technology related to WMD and some conventional arms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Order 12938</td>
<td>November 1994</td>
<td>Imposed export controls on sensitive WMD technology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Orders 12957, 12959</td>
<td>March-May 1995</td>
<td>Prohibited all U.S. investment in Iran, including in the oil sector. Banned export of American goods to Iran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran and Libya Sanctions Act</td>
<td>August 1996</td>
<td>Sanctioned companies that invest more than $20 million in the Iranian oil sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Order 13059</td>
<td>August 1997</td>
<td>Expanded ban on exports to Iran.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The United States again attacked Iran in 2006 for its nuclear progress, which was seen as worrying by other countries. Although Iran disputed all of the claims and stated that the nuclear development it carried out was a peaceful effort, there was no evidence of constructing a nuclear bomb, as ordered by the US to him (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs: 7). Iran's attitude did not deter the United States' desire to sanction Iran again. This is because the US sanctions are intended to hinder Iran's nuclear development, even though the US assumption that Iran is developing nuclear weapons is not supported by credible evidence.

Table 2

US Embargo Sanctions against Iran Until 2006-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description of Select Elements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iran Non-proliferation Act</strong></td>
<td>March 2000</td>
<td>Sanctioned entities providing goods related to WMD or ballistic missiles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Executive Order 13224</strong></td>
<td>September 2001</td>
<td>Blocked property of terrorists and financial supporters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Executive Order 13382</strong></td>
<td>June 2005</td>
<td>Blocked property of WMD proliferators.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Belfer Center, 2012
Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012

January 2013
Sanctioned involvement in Iranian energy, shipping or shipbuilding, or provision of insurance or reinsurance to shipping firms. Sanctioned provision of precious metals to Iran.

Executive Order 13645
June 2013
Sanctioned involvement in the Iranian automotive industry. Blocked assets of banks doing business in rials, the currency of Iran.

Source: Belfer Center, 2012

The table shows that the United States, as a country imposing embargo sanctions on Iran, has asked its partners and allies to quickly cut the amount of Iranian oil imported. There are no exceptions to the steps taken not to carry out directions and commands issued by the United States to its partners and allies. Turkey, a NATO ally country, supports the US embargo on Iran. Turkey's support and allegiance to the United States is demonstrated in part by lessening its reliance on Iranian oil shipments. This import reduction began in 2012, with a 20% fall in overall Iranian oil imports to Turkey. It was further cut to 40% in 2014.

Table 3
Decrease in Iranian Oil Imports to Turkey 2011-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>State/Bloc</th>
<th>Purchase 2011</th>
<th>Purchase 2012</th>
<th>Purchase 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Uni Eropa (terkhusus Yunani, Italia dan Spanyol)</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>Diabaikan</td>
<td>Diabaikan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>550,000</td>
<td>380,000</td>
<td>410,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Jepang</td>
<td>325,000</td>
<td>170,000</td>
<td>190,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>320,000</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>190,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Korea Selatan</td>
<td>230,000</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>130,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Turki</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Afrika Selatan</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Srilanka</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>Diabaikan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Singapura</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Lainnya</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>Diabaikan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,505 million barrels/day</td>
<td>1,27 million barrels/day</td>
<td>1,057 million barrels/day</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf

Turkey's stance on the embargo against Iran is a sort of support it provides as a US partner and alliance country. This is also proportional to the benefits Turkey derives from its longstanding bilateral relations with the United States. As a result, Turkey will probably make major efforts to retain positive relations with the United States. However, when Iran was sanctioned again by the US embargo in mid-2018, Turkey took a different approach than in 2012. Instead, Turkey ignored US requests and orders for its partners and friends to immediately stop importing Iranian oil.

The United States has given its partners and allies until November 4, 2018, to stop importing oil from Iran. Otherwise, the United States will impose economic penalties
against the country. Even now, the United States is preparing to slap penalties on its partner countries. Senator Bon Menendez, who helped design the penalties, stated: "Today we are giving three months to all countries that still import petroleum and petroleum products from Iran to significantly reduce their imports. Otherwise, they will be threatened with severe sanctions against their financial institutions." (Farid, 2012, p. 1)

Not only has Turkey gone against US policy and regulations, but it has also prolonged the collaboration arrangement to buy Iranian oil until 2026, which should have expired in 2020. The content of this contract extension also includes an increase in imports to 9.6 million barrels per year.

**Turkey's Foreign Policy Towards Iranian Oil Imports**

Proaction seeks to change certain aspects of current issue resolution (Morgan and Palmer, 1996). Proaction requires a state to expend resources to change the target state's policies (Morgan and Palmer, 1996). The state's efforts will be devoted to changing aspects of the status quo that it dislikes (Morgan and Palmer, 1996:228). In the study, researchers assessed Turkey's foreign policy response to the US embargo penalties imposed against Iran in 2018. Turkey's approach is more proactive because it chooses not to obey the wishes and directions of the US to its allies and alliance countries in response to the embargo penalties put on Iran.

The embargo restrictions imposed by the United States on Iran will damage not just Iran but also its partners and allies. This is because the US also directed its partners and alliances to immediately cease importing Iranian oil until November 4, 2018 (US Department of State). If partner and alliance countries do not comply with US wants and directives, the US will impose penalties (US Department of State, 2018). It did not take long for the United States to establish a group tasked with compiling the penalties that would be implemented.

Several indicators point to Turkey's shift in allegiance from the US (west) to Iran (east):

1. **Dispute Initiation**

   Following the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey became one of the US's partner countries and alliances, and all its actions became more pro-western (Ayla Gol, 1992: 57). This pro-western behavior began during the reign of the first Turkish President, Attaturk, and continued until the next government. However, since 2003, under the Necdet government, this pro-western action has shifted focus. Turkey's focus began to shift eastward, with the establishment of links with its Middle Eastern neighbors (Ali Sezal, 2016). Turkey also began to open by collaborating with eastern countries such as China, Russia, Iran, and several others (Atli, 2016).

   Turkey's pro-Western policies began to wane during the Necdet administration. It faded even further during the subsequent governments of Abdullah Gul and Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Many of the strategies implemented appeared to prioritize
neighboring countries over the United States (west) as an alliance and partner (Barkey, 2011). One example of US neglect as a partner and alliance country occurred in mid-2018 when the US slapped economic sanctions on Iran. This embargo compels Iran to cease exporting oil, and US allies and coalitions are asked to discontinue participation in importing oil from Iran.

However, in 2018, Turkey took a different approach, extending its oil import cooperation with Iran until 2026 (Austvik and Rzayeva, 2016:7). Following the extension, the country's oil imports increased to 9.6 million barrels per year (Austvik and Rzayeva, 2016:7). Turkey elected to continue buying oil from Iran due to the country’s necessities, as the Iran sanctions occurred during Turkey’s winter season. Iran's resources are required to provide heating for the Turkish people, and the government should not disregard its citizens' interests.

Turkey's acts that disregard US instructions have harmed Turkey-US relations, particularly in terms of economic cooperation. Initially, the relationship between the two countries reportedly heated up when the US imposed embargo restrictions on Turkey in early August 2018, after Turkey imprisoned a US pastor suspected of being behind the 2016 uprising in Turkey. The US will slap economic sanctions on Turkey if it continues to cooperate in oil shipments from Iran.

Turkey is attempting to modify the current status quo based on its attitude toward US demands and instructions, as well as the consequences it will face. The status quo of Turkey-US relations involves cordial relations between the two nations through collaboration partners and alliances, as well as efforts to influence the US's policies regarding embargo sanctions against Iran to partner countries and alliances. This attitude is the start of a confrontation between Turkey to the United States, which is currently experiencing an increasingly hot relationship.

2. Change (an indication of alliance change)

The second action that demonstrates a country’s pursuit for proaction is a shift in its focus (alliance) (New York Times, 2018). This is characterized by a direct statement from the country's leader, a shift in the proaction-seeking country's attitude toward responding to the issues of the prospective new alliance country, and bilateral cooperation. Turkey, a country that wants proactivity through the issue of US embargo sanctions against Iran in 2018, made many acts as an indicator of changes in its partnership, including (1) Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s remark in a letter to the United States dated August 10, 2018.

"Before it is too late, Washington must give up the misguided notion that our relationship can be asymmetrical and come to terms with the fact that Turkey has alternatives. Failure to reverse this trend of unilateralism and disrespect will require us to start looking for new friends and allies." (New York Times, 2018, p. 1).
In this article, Turkey claims that it has other options (alliances) if the US continues to behave by its intentions while failing to consider Turkey's stance (the requirements of Turkish nationals), as well as the consequences of the US attitude that orders, then sanctions if not carried out. This is one type of warning Turkey has issued to the US in response to the US attitude, which has recently made it difficult for Turkey to take a stand on problems concerning the US and countries with whom it disagrees. Turkey, as a US partner and alliance member, should support and carry out US policies.

Especially after the US exited the JCPOA agreement in May 2018, which was followed by the application of economic penalties on Iran and partner nations that continued to import Iranian oil until November 4, 2018. As a result of the US's pressure, President Erdogan eventually authored the following piece, which was addressed to the US President. Trump.

(2) In reaction to US embargo penalties on Iran, Turkey prefers not to embargo Iran in 2018. Turkey prefers to continue and grow its oil and gas imports from Iran. Turkey is doing this since it is going through winter and these materials will be indispensable as resources that it uses in the winter (New York Times, 2018). If Turkey embargoes Iran, it will lose supplies that its people sorely need throughout the winter. Turkey will rather prioritize its country over the demands and orders of its partner and alliance, the United States.

The United States, as a partner and alliance, has supplied Turkey with a solution to shift its energy suppliers from Iran to Saudi Arabia (US State Department, 2018). The United States has also encouraged Saudi Arabia to enhance its oil and natural gas production to suit the demands of its allies and alliance countries that are shifting from Iran to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has agreed on this. However, for popular reasons, Turkey continues to purchase oil and natural gas from Iran.

(3) Turkey and Iran share many similar perspectives on Middle Eastern affairs. In many cases, they support and are extremely concerned about Middle Eastern affairs. They also prioritize excellent connections with its neighboring countries. Although Turkey and Iran have opposing views and support on the Syrian issue, the two nations already have a great deal of agreement on many other matters.

(4) Cooperation between Turkey and Iran improves year after year. For example, bilateral commerce between the two countries rose for the first time since 2012 (Neve, 2018). The Turkish Statistical Institute reported in 2018 that exports from Iran to Turkey increased from $4.7 billion in 2016 to $7.5 billion in 2017. (Neve, 2018) Although exports increased in 2018, the Turkish Statistical Institute has not revealed the total computation.
Furthermore, military cooperation between the two countries has improved. Several meetings were conducted to discuss Middle Eastern issues, particularly Syria. In Syria, they hold opposing viewpoints, resulting in disparities in support between the two countries. However, the increased military collaboration aims to bring about peace in Syria. Turkey, Iran, and Russia have agreed to establish de-escalation zones in the northern province of Idlib, as well as adjacent portions of Latakia, Hama, and Aleppo, to bring Syria’s seven-year war to an end.

With the initiation of conflict and indications of a new alliance shift by Turkey as a result of the US embargo against Iran, Turkey has fulfilled the elements of its proaction-seeking actions, which began by ignoring the orders given by the US to its partners and allies in response to the embargo issue against Iran. Finally, Turkey’s statements, attitudes, and actions toward the US and Iran point to a shift in its partnership.

**Background of Proaction-Seeking Measures in Turkish Foreign Policy**

Turkey’s proactivity in foreign policy is motivated by a variety of factors. According to the two-good hypothesis, a country will pick proaction as its foreign policy aim if it believes its relationship with the target country is inefficient and the proaction-seeking country’s capabilities allow for proaction. This subchapter will illustrate the inefficiency of Turkey-US relations, as well as Turkey’s ability to cope with the US in its proaction quest.

*Weak bilateral cooperation between Turkey and the United States*

As previously said, Turkey benefits from its bilateral relationship with the United States, particularly in terms of security. This security also includes the establishment of a generally stable Turkish political climate and an economy that grows year after year. Although the relationship between Turkey and the United States has had its ups and downs, Turkey values its security connection with the United States. Turkey lives in a harsh and unpredictable environment, and it has ongoing tensions with several of its neighbors. (Neve, 2018) Turkey’s unsafe situation is felt because it is within range of missiles launched from Iran and Iraq.

Thus, Turkey sees its security relationship with the United States as an important insurance policy against its growing vulnerability to the possibility of Middle Eastern conflict (Neve, 2018). The United States is also Turkey’s largest arms supplier, accounting for around 80% of defense industry activity (Neve, 2018). Most Turkish officers have received training in the United States as part of its military and security cooperation. This demonstrates the importance of Turkey’s security relationship with the United States. Turkey’s proximity to belligerent Middle Eastern countries, as well as a region prone to new crises, contribute to this. However, in addition to military security, Turkey requires financial (economic) security.

The United States has demonstrated on numerous occasions that it is a faithful ally with Turkey, notably in economic matters. To be more specific, when Turkey faced an economic crisis in 2001, the US was Turkey’s partner and alliance country, providing direct and indirect economic aid. This US support was ultimately successful in getting Turkey out of the economic crisis, allowing it to avoid suffering significant losses. This is
one way the United States provides Turkey with economic comfort and security. Furthermore, the United States, as Turkey’s partner and alliance country, assists Turkey in achieving complete sovereignty over its country, one example being its support for Turkey’s membership in the European Union (Lubis, 2005).

But in recent years, the United States has taken a different stance toward Turkey. The United States chooses to disregard the comforts it has provided Turkey. This comfort comes in the form of economic, political, and regional stability. Furthermore, the United States is Turkey’s major armaments supplier. The United States has taken multiple steps to halt the delivery of arms and equipment to Turkey. Turkey has experienced several events in recent years (since 2016).

First, the US was alleged to be behind Turkey’s 2016 coup (Zanotti). The coup in Turkey compelled President Erdogan to resign from his position of power. However, the Turkish government successfully stopped the coup and swiftly sought out the perpetrators. The arrested offenders ultimately provided clues as to where the United States was suspected of being behind the coup. Fethullah Gullen and US Pastor Andrew Brunson are widely regarded as the primary culprits of Turkey’s 2016 coup (Zanotti, 2016), despite the lack of credible proof. Fethullah Gullen fled to the United States, which was unwilling to accept him until 2018, and instead kept him hidden from Turkey. Meanwhile, Pastor Brunson, who was detained by Turkey, remains in a Turkish prison, even though the US has demanded that the pastor be released and transferred to the US. Despite making compromises, such as placing Pastor Brunson under house arrest, Turkey prefers to keep him in detention.

Second, due to Turkey’s continuing arrest of Pastor Brunson, the US slapped economic sanctions on Turkey in early August 2018. The US’s economic embargo penalties against Turkey have caused an economic crisis as well as a currency value problem (Infocus, 2018). This crisis also led to a deterioration of the Turkish economy till the end of 2018. This is expected to continue until the embargo is lifted by the US. However, Turkey has so far refused to hand over Pastor Brunson to the United States. As a result of the US embargo on Turkey, President Erdogan stated that "the US stabbed Turkey in the back.” Turkey believes that this is not the type of mentality that the United States, as Turkey’s ally, should adopt. Instead, the US treated Turkey as if it were not a partner and alliance country, ignored Turkey’s economic crisis, and maintained embargo sanctions.

Third, following the embargo measures, the United States has largely disagreed with Turkey’s decisions and attitudes in response to current international challenges. Especially during the US-imposed economic sanctions on Iran in mid-2018. Turkey is uneasy with the US mentality, which dictates more to Turkey in every move it makes (New York Times, 2018). On one occasion, Erdogan voiced unhappiness with the US attitude, which appeared to disrespect Turkey as a sovereign country (New York Times, 2018). Which has complete authority to make judgments for its country. There are always US threats in every move made by Turkey that is not by US intentions.

Fourth, the United States, Turkey’s main supplier of military equipment and weaponry, postponed delivery of a stealth aircraft bought by Turkey in 2018. In truth,
Turkey has paid the majority of the aircraft’s cost and will repay it once it arrives in the country. However, due to the current warming of Turkey-US relations and Turkey’s refusal to free Pastor Brunson, the US ultimately decided to suspend the delivery of the F-35 aircraft bought by Turkey. Even though this aircraft will be deployed in the Syrian war, it has hampered some of Turkey’s efforts in the country (Zanotti, 2018). Another negative consequence of Turkey-US relations may be seen in the military exercises that were halted, even though these exercises helped Turkey develop the capabilities of its military forces.

Turkey is finally attempting to obtain the four items that the US is now withholding from it, although Turkey needs these items from its alliance partners. This alternative is to strengthen bilateral connections with eastern countries, particularly Iran. Although, as we all know, Iran and Turkey have a low degree of concord, the two nations do have bilateral collaboration in a variety of fields. For example, when the US applied economic penalties, in addition to the economic crisis, the lira exchange rate fell by 20% (Infocus, 2018). The lira’s value fell as a result of the United States’ economic blockade on Turkey. However, eastern countries like China, Russia, Iran, and some European countries developed an alternative economic alliance to assist Turkey in this situation (Jawa Pos, 2018).

Turkey's economic situation has improved with the formation of an alternative economic coalition. Turkey sees Iran as an important country to support its economy in the middle of its current turmoil. The Turkish Minister of Energy Resources stated directly: "Iran is an important neighbor of Turkey, given both our bilateral economic and commercial relations as well as our energy imports." (Tribune, 2018).

In addition to economic aid, the fact that Iran can be a target market for Turkish investment and economic development helps to enhance the Turkish economy. Furthermore, Iran produces a large number of weapons and military equipment. Turkey imports certain weapons from Iran and other eastern nations by conducting transactions to purchase weapons and combat equipment in those countries (Tribune, 2018).

Relations with Iran also improved when Turkey and Iran met in 2017 to explore increased military cooperation (Toksabay, 2017). This military collaboration helps to improve border security, particularly in war zones like Syria. The two countries are also attempting to reconcile their positions on their separate involvement in Syria. This effort seeks to establish peace in Syria (Lindenstrauss, 2018). This is predicated on each country’s common purpose of promoting peace in the Middle East (Lindenstrauss, 2018).

From some of the answers above, it is clear that Iran, as one of the eastern countries, has a special relationship with Turkey. Iran is attempting to meet Turkey's demands that the US cannot currently meet. One of them is border security, which was initially given by the US to Turkey but has since been superseded by Turkey and Iran’s attempts to establish border security in the Middle East. The economic and political protection that the United States initially provided to Turkey is gradually eroding. Especially when Turkey experienced a coup in 2016. Although the attempt was foiled by
the Turkish government, it indicated that Turkey's political stability and security were deteriorating.

In terms of economic security, Turkey's economy, which was initially strong and continued to grow, was compounded by the US embargo on Turkey. Iran, as one of the eastern countries, assisted Turkey throughout this crisis through alternative economic partnerships, along with China, Russia, and several other European countries. Furthermore, respect for Turkey as a sovereign state is essential in any partnership. This means that a country's decisions are appreciated and respected. When the United States gradually comes to disdain Turkey as a sovereign state by constantly dictating and criticizing any Turkish actions that it views as anti-US, it might make a country uneasy in continuing an alliance connection. Especially when it can identify a country that shares its goals and can provide what it needs. As a result, a country's alliance will most likely shift.

Turkey’s capabilities

In the hunt for action, some elements support such acts, such as a country's sufficient and capable capacities (Morgan and Palmer, 1996). Not only that, but a country's skills must include something that the target country requires to foster a sense of dependence on that country. (Morgan and Palmer, 1996) This is one of the keys to identifying proactivity in a country's foreign policy.

A viable alternative alliance is one of the factors that a country will assess before taking action. The strength of the potential new alliance country will complement the strength of the action-seeking nation. If it is believed that by combining forces, the country will be able to balance or outperform the prior alliance country. This is evident from the security situation of the prospective alliance country.

**Turkey’s Military Power**

According to data given by Global Fire Power (GFP) on its official website in 2018, Turkey is ranked ninth in the world, with high military strength compared to other countries. This rating is down from seventh place in the globe in 2017. Turkey's economic turmoil has also had an impact on its status.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GFP Affiliation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>North America; NATO; Apacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Apacific; Eastern Euro; Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Apacific; Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>India</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Europe; NATO; European Union</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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Table 3

Ranking of Military Power in the World in 2018
The variables used to rank military power are divided into various categories: manpower, airpower, army strength (land power), naval power, financial resources, logistical resources, natural resources, geography, and miscellaneous. The categories indicated above, it is further broken into various divisions, which will be discussed in describing Turkey's military might, resulting in it ranking ninth in the world.

**Turkey's Regional and International Position (Power)**

Since President Erdogan’s reign, Turkey has made significant developments in foreign relations, as well as its regional and international standing, and has begun to be considered regionally and internationally. Although this began during Abdullah Gul's presidency, with Prime Minister Erdogan. During the Syrian crisis, Turkey served as an efficient mediator between Syria and Israel. In 2010, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem stated bluntly, "Turkey has shown itself to be an honest mediator; therefore, the indirect talks should be under Turkish mediation and begin in Turkey, where the talks have been halted" (Purwoko, 2018).

Turkey is likewise a Muslim country that actively condemns Israeli human rights atrocities in Palestine (Dethlefsen, 2007). Turkey opposes the formation of Israel on Palestinian territory. When the United States proposed locating its embassy in Jerusalem in 2017, Turkey strongly opposed the move. At the UN session in New York on December 21, 2017, Turkey vehemently rejected the US plan to establish an embassy in Jerusalem (Dewi, 2017). Turkey's stance was supported by 127 other countries that voted against the initiative.

Furthermore, Turkey regularly protests the injustices faced by Muslims around the world as a result of terrorist accusations (Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008). This charge refers to the claim that all acts of terrorism in the globe are perpetrated by Muslims. Following the 9/11 catastrophe, Muslims have acquired a negative reputation. They claim that these acts are exclusively committed by Muslims who are fanatical Islamists. Turkey strives to portray Muslims as peace-loving people who avoid violence.
Turkey, under President Erdoğan, actively promotes the false image of Muslims. Erdogan has stated in numerous addresses that Muslims do not condone or defend acts of violence, including terrorism. Turkey likewise dares to openly oppose the United States when Muslims are accused of terrorist crimes. The Muslim world regards Turkey as the first Muslim country to publicly reject the West for the image it portrays of Muslims (Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008). Many people believe that Turkey, led by President Erdogan, will become the Muslim world’s leader, uniting the world’s divided Muslims.

Turkey's assertiveness in advocating for Muslim interests, rights, and injustice has earned it a high level of esteem throughout the Middle East and other Muslim countries. Furthermore, this positive image expanded to other nations, and Turkey is now one of the countries whose voices are heard around the world (Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008).

**Turkey’s Closeness to Russia, China, and Iran as an Alternative Alliance for Turkey**

During President Kenan Evren’s rule, Turkey began to open up by engaging with Eastern countries rather than focusing solely on the West. This marked the beginning of Turkey’s contacts with China, Russia, and several other eastern countries. Turkey believes that it needs to expand its collaboration with countries other than the West, but this will not alter Turkey's pro-Western stance.

China, Russia, and Iran are eastern countries that have reasonably robust security. Security encompasses economics, military, and politics. The three countries’ ability to handle their security has resulted in international stability and power. China is currently one of the countries with the highest economic growth rates. Despite ups and downs in China’s economic growth, the country continues to have one of the world’s highest GDPs.

![Figure 1: China's Economic Growth Chart, 2005-2018.](image)

*Source: Wind, KPMG analysis*

China, Russia, Iran, Turkey, and numerous European countries have formed the Alternative Economic Alliance (Jawa Pos, 2018). This alliance intends to support member countries who are undergoing economic challenges. As was the case with the Turkish crisis last August, this alliance is attempting to deliver economic support to Turkey. So
that Turkey can overcome the economic crisis that has caused the lira's value to plummet as well as the slowing of Turkey's growth.

Iran's unfriendly relationship with the United States has resulted in embargoes imposed by the US since the 1970s. The US imposed an economic blockade on Iran because it feared that Iran was secretly building nuclear weapons, not to meet resource needs, but to create an atomic bomb. As a result of US suspicion, Iran received its first economic embargo restrictions in 1970, with the most recent in mid-2018. These economic embargo measures first posed economic challenges for Iran, which was strongly reliant on the United States. Iran was able to weather the economic downturn thanks to its self-sufficiency (WTO, 2018). This demonstrates that Iran is among the countries with a solid economy. Iran’s robust economy is also attributed to its innovation and efficient economic operations.

Aside from the economics, the three countries’ military capability is vital in determining their global status. As seen in Table 1, China, Russia, and Iran are among the 15 countries with strong military forces in the globe. Russia manufactures and supplies modern weapons that can compete with those made in the United States. Russia is the world’s second most powerful country behind the United States, with China coming in third and Iran ranking thirteenth. If China, Iran, Russia, and Turkey band together, the situation in Syria and global power dynamics are expected to shift (Sokmen, 2018). This is a source of concern for the United States since its international position will shift, potentially placing it among these four countries. If this collaboration comes to fruition, it will be spectacular.

The three potential countries for the Turkish alliance have a considerable worldwide presence. Iran has a positive image and significant power in Islamic countries, particularly those that practice Shia Islam. Meanwhile, China is regarded as a growing power in a variety of fields, including politics, economics, and global influence. China is thought to be capable of becoming a competitor to the United States in the future, thanks to its growing dominance. Finally, Russia leads the Eastern Bloc, while the United States leads the Western Bloc. As a result, it is possible to conclude that Russia wields considerable power, particularly in communist countries.

Russia plays an important part in Turkey’s alternative alliance with three countries (China, Iran, and Russia). In addition to its dominance as the Eastern Bloc’s leader, Russia possesses the ability to match the US’s weapons arsenal. Not only armaments, but all other military equipment is competitive with that of the United States. In essence, Turkey’s capabilities are complemented by those of its potential alliance partners. These countries’ power and supremacy play a significant part in improving Turkey’s capabilities, in addition to Turkey’s own.

**Turkey’s bargaining position with the US**

The United States and NATO use Incirlik, Turkey, as a military post. The US initially began construction of the base, located about 250 miles southeast of Ankara, Turkey, in the spring of 1951 (Incirlik, 2013). The Turkish General Staff and the US Air Force signed a joint usage agreement for the new base in December 1954 (Incirlik, 2013). Incirlik’s
location was essential for the US and NATO, not only in deterring the Soviet threat but also in responding to events developing in the Middle East.

Since the facility commenced operations, the US and NATO have taken numerous activities in response to Middle Eastern challenges and wars. Some US engagements in the Middle East that employed Adana Air Base included the 2003-2011 invasion of Iraq and NATO military operations in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2015.

Based on statistics provided by the United States. Incirlik had eight primary missions for the Air Force in 2015, including humanitarian assistance, aerial surveillance, aerial cover for combat operations, freight and troop transport, no-fly zone enforcement, refueling hubs, leaflet drops, air strikes, and nuclear deterrence (Air Force, 2018).

Looking at Turkey’s capabilities in military power, regional and international position, close relations with eastern countries, strength in economic, political, and military aspects, and looking at what Turkey can provide to the US as one of its key strengths, Turkey is seen as capable enough to take foreign policy aimed at seeking proaction. Strengthened when Turkey can use the Incirlik region as a threat to the US when the US violates its obligations as a Turkish ally.

3. CONCLUSION

Turkey’s foreign policy in response to the US embargo on Iran is characterized as action-oriented. Based on Turkey’s attitude of creating conflict with the US on the topic of the embargo against Iran in 2018. This conflict beginning is defined by Turkey’s refusal to cut off Iranian oil imports to its country. In addition, responding to the US attitude that made threats against Turkey’s attitude, through a letter addressed by Turkey (through President Erdogan) to the US, Turkey explicitly warned that Turkey had an alternative alliance if the US still acted like this. This is one illustration of the alliance move that Turkey can make, from west to east. Especially lately, Turkey has been engaging with eastern countries in numerous respects. With the attitude of conflict initiation and indicators of changing alliances, the purpose of Turkish Foreign Policy is the quest for proaction. In essence, the change in attitude taken by a country depends on changes in the interests, demands and capabilities of the country. Whether the country will seek proaction or security in its foreign policy.

4. DAFTAR PUSTAKA


Compiled From Wire Service. Turkey Not Obliged to Abide by Sanctions Imposed by US or UK Against Iran, FM Says. Daily


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